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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early, heady, halcyon days of the conflict-resolution movement, the 
true believers asserted that all conflicts could be resolved through the persistent 
application of a rational, constructive mediation process. Some asserted that 
mediating with a divorcing couple was ultimately no different than mediating 
with warring factions in international disputes or internal civil unrest. That 
many of those making such assertions at the time had never mediated in the 
context of large-scale, intergroup conflict was not lost on those skeptics who 
had. The latter summarily dismissed the bold assertions of the former, and the 
field of conflict resolution has since evolved into two primary camps, one 
concerning itself primarily with interpersonal, dyadic disputes and the other 
focusing on intergroup conflicts of various scales.1 The field is palpably divided 
between those who work with individuals in conflict and those who work with 
groups in conflict. This symposium challenges us to bridge that divide because, 
although the symposium’s focus is on group-conflict resolution, the emotions 
and behaviors associated with apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are 
experienced at a deeply personal and individual level. 
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 1. The former might be categorized as part of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
movement, and the latter are more likely to identify with the peace or peacemaking movement. Of 
course, the development of the field is a more complex story. Indeed, many practitioners do both 
interpersonal and intergroup work. In addition, some practitioners who engage in intergroup work, 
such as those who do environmental and public-policy consensus-building or work as diplomats, are 
unlikely to identify themselves with the individuals and NGOs who consider themselves part of the 
peace movement. 
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This article takes up the challenge by introducing a biological approach to 
understanding resistance to apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in 
intergroup conflict. To start with, reconciliation takes place at the level of the 
individual. To understand resistance to group reconciliation, one must 
understand why individuals resist reconciliation. In turn, one must understand 
how membership in the group affects individual resistance. This article first 
examines the behaviors that promote or discourage reconciliation. Using 
evolutionary biology and game theory, we illustrate how the strategic dynamics 
of dyadic interaction tend to favor these behaviors and derive a schema relevant 
to a reconciliatory cycle. We then explore how the distinct context of intra- and 
intergroup conflict reinforces these behaviors. Finally, we identify those barriers 
to individual reconciliation that result from the strategic dynamics of social-
group architectures, particularly those that differ from the ancestral social 
architecture within which individual behavior has evolved. We conclude with a 
brief application of this conceptual approach to truth and reconciliation 
commissions. 
II 
WHAT IS RECONCILIATION? 
Reconciliation is the Holy Grail of conflict resolution. Specifically, it refers 
to the restoration of a preexisting cooperative relationship after estrangement.2 
Reconciliation among those who have had a relationship is important for the 
simple reason that we fight more amongst ourselves than with others. That is to 
say, we have more conflicts within social groups3 than between groups, and 
resolving those conflicts is essential for the survival of the group. Ostensibly, 
some benefits to be gained in the group relationship cannot be more easily 
gained outside of it; however, the increased interaction of individuals within a 
group leads to more situations in which conflict can arise. Thus, we are more 
likely to have disputes with our spouses, our children, our siblings, our parents, 
our friends, our neighbors, and our colleagues than with strangers. Conflict is 
unavoidable in these relationships and, if left unresolved, it has the potential to 
tear them apart with the concomitant loss in the benefits of cooperation. 
Reconciliation is how we preserve and repair cooperative relationships in the 
face of our disputing. 
 
 2. In this sense, it is distinguishable from a mere resolution or settlement. Both resolution and 
settlement do not necessarily entail the end of a dispute or of the underlying conflict. See DOUGLAS H. 
YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 375, 380, 392 (1999) (defining reconciliation as 
“[r]enewal of applicable relations between persons who have been at variance,” resolution as 
“[s]olution or the act of solving,” and settlement as “[a]greement or arrangement ending a dispute”). In 
animal behavior, reconciliation refers to friendly reunions between former opponents and implies a 
behavior that serves the function of restoring social relationships and reducing social tension due to 
aggressive incidences. See NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 397 (Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. de 
Waal eds., 2000).  
 3. For our purposes, a social group is simply two or more individuals in a cooperative relationship. 
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More broadly, reconciliation refers to the establishment of cooperative 
relations between persons, either individuals or groups, who have been at 
variance without regard to whether they have had a prior cooperative 
relationship.4 As strangers encounter one another and come into conflict in 
pursuit of their own interests, they can choose to either compete or cooperate. 
If they initially compete and find the costs unacceptable, they can either 
disengage or attempt to form a cooperative relationship. Conflict-resolution 
practitioners commonly refer to such a transition from competition to 
cooperation—particularly in the context of large-scale, intergroup conflict—as 
reconciliation. It encompasses a variety of interventions meant to transform a 
temporary peace into a stable or permanent peace in which the parties 
cooperate or at least tolerate one another. 5  The most notable 
institutionalization of these interventions is the truth and reconciliation 
commission.6 Most of these interventions are broadly influenced by concepts of 
restorative justice, which focuses on the effect of an offense on individuals 
rather than on the state in an attempt to promote the restoration of 
interpersonal relationships.7 Consistent with the restorative-justice philosophy, 
reconciliation efforts tend to operate at the individual level by addressing such 
human emotions as fear, anger, and distrust.8 Indeed, such emotions express the 
 
 4. Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 41, 61 
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000). 
 5. See generally JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997). 
 6. Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) are organizations designed to investigate alleged 
human-rights violations in a particular locale in an attempt to resolve longstanding intergroup conflict 
so as to enable future peace. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 
1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). The most famous commission was 
undoubtedly South Africa’s TRC. Organized in 1995, the TRC was a court-like body that attempted to 
ease South Africa’s transition to democracy by holding hearings into the human-rights abuses of 
apartheid. For an overview, see ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2001). 
 7. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
(2002). For a theoretical defense of restorative justice and a comparison to traditional theories of 
punishment, see Zvi D. Gabbay, Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of 
Restorative Justice Practices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 349 (2005). For a proposal that elements of 
restorative justice should be implemented into American criminal procedure, see Stephanos Bibas & 
Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 
(2004). 
 8. According to Haas, 
There is at least one common denominator to all these approaches to reconciliation. They all 
are designed to lead individual men and women to change the way they think about their his-
torical adversaries. As a result, reconciliation occurs one person at a time and is normally a 
long and laborious process. 
Charles Haas, Reconciliation, in BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess eds., 2003), 
available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation/?nid=1224. Lederach describes the 
goal as “building and healing the torn fabric of interpersonal and community lives and relationships.” 
John Paul Lederach, Civil Society and Reconciliation, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF 
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 841, 842 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela 
Aall eds., 2001) (emphasis added). 
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underlying sources of resistance to reconciliation, and evolutionary biology 
offers an explanation of why humans experience them. 
III 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND THE RECONCILIATORY CYCLE 
Emotions are biological. We experience an emotion when the brain 
responds to stimuli and, in turn, produces neurochemicals triggering a 
physiological response that we associate with a particular behavior, experience, 
or activity.9 The human brain has been shaped by evolutionary forces producing 
a species-typical brain10 that produces species-typical behavioral outputs in 
response to various stimuli. As the terms are used in biology, the proximate 
cause of an emotion is the brain’s response to the stimuli, whereas the ultimate 
cause of an emotion can be traced to the evolutionary forces that shaped the 
human brain to so respond.11 Those forces were the basic challenges of survival 
in the environment in which our current species-typical brain evolved. 
Biologists refer to these challenges as the environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness (EEA). 12  The EEA consists of both physical and social 
environments, the essential challenges of which consisted of food choice 
(eating), predator avoidance (survival), and mate selection (reproduction). If a 
given behavior is common for humans today, then the predisposition to so 
behave may have enhanced survival and reproduction over time in the EEA 
and, as a result, became “hard-wired” in our brains through natural selection.13 
The social challenges of the EEA are particularly germane to the problem 
of reconciliation. Humans are highly social animals. Living in groups was crucial 
to our ancestors’ survival. In the EEA, social-group formation was a 
 
 9. A tremendous number of theoretical perspectives on emotions have emerged in various fields 
over the course of time. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 2009). The perspective adopted by Bandes most nearly reflects 
a neurobiological theory with an evolutionary perspective. For a useful overview of the neurobiological 
theory of emotion, see JOSEPH E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS 
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996). 
 10. Each individual’s unique psychological profile results from a combination of species-typical 
brain, other inherited characteristics, and the effects of experience and environment on the brain. See 
John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND: 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 19, 68 (Jerome H. Barkow, Leda 
Cosmides & John Tooby eds., 1995). 
 11. For an exploration of the proximate and ultimate causes of empathy, see generally Stephanie 
D. Preston & Frans B.M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN 
SCI. 1 (2002). 
 12. This term was coined by John Bowlby in reference to his work in attachment theory. JOHN 
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT (2d ed. 1999). 
 13. This is a fundamental principle of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary biologists generally 
recognize an architectural element of an organism as a presumptive adaptation when “it solves an 
adaptive problem with ‘reliability, efficiency, and economy.’” Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, 
Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer (1997), http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html. For 
many biologists and evolutionary psychologists, “hard-wired” may be too strong a term to describe an 
inherited behavioral predisposition from which individuals can vary and are not predestined to behave. 
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cooperative behavior that improved our ancestors’ ability to warn of and fight 
off predators and to find food and mates.14 With social living, however, came 
conflict and competition over resources. From a biological perspective, 
competitive behavior is hardly surprising, for purely selfish or self-regarding 
behavior would certainly seem to enhance reproduction and the survivability of 
one’s genes in a world of scarce resources. But constant competition and 
conflict among all group members would quickly erode social cohesion. The 
adaptive way to deal with conspecific conflict (conflict within a species), and 
thereby to maintain the benefits of group living, was to form cooperative 
friendships, alliances, and coalitions. This required some level of seemingly 
altruistic behavior that enhanced the reproductive fitness of others at an 
apparent cost to the actor. Such cooperative, altruistic behavior among kin 
makes biological sense and is common among animals—the closer the kin, the 
more shared genes.15 Altruistic behavior toward non-kin is also common among 
social animals and has been explained by the notion of direct reciprocity—by 
helping B today, A expects B to reciprocate tomorrow.16 But there is a critical 
tension between cooperative, altruistic behavior and competitive behavior—
how does A trust B to behave fairly? While it is our nature to cooperate, it is 
also our nature to “cheat” and take advantage of others’ tendencies to 
cooperate because the competitive “selfish gene”17 tempts B to defect and 
merely free ride (gain the benefits of cooperation without the costs). The result 
is a fundamental social dilemma: How does one determine whom to trust, 
whether one has been treated fairly, and what to do when cheated? 
Game theory reveals a partial solution through the iterated, prisoners’ 
dilemma game,18 in which a reciprocating strategy of tit-for-tat reduces cheating 
and encourages cooperation. In a tit-for-tat strategy, one’s first move is 
cooperative, while successive moves mimic those of the other player. If he 
 
 14. See ROBERT L. BETTINGER, HUNTER-GATHERERS: ARCHEOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY 158 (1991) (hunting efficiency); ROGER LEWIN & ROBERT A. FOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF 
HUMAN EVOLUTION 168 (2004) (noting that social-group formation served as a defense against 
predation). See generally DAVID BUSS, THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (2003) (detailing social-
behavior adaptations to the various challenges and problems present in the EEA). 
 15. See W.D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behaviour I, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 
1 (1964) (laying out a precise mathematical formulation of the tendency for altruistic behavior as a 
function of the percentage of genes shared). This is generally referred to as “inclusive fitness.” 
 16. Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 35 (1971). 
 17. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 4–12 (1976). 
 18. The classical formulation of the prisoners’ dilemma game is as follows: Two suspected 
criminals, A and B, are arrested. The District Attorney lacks sufficient evidence for a conviction, so she 
visits each of the suspects separately to offer the same deal: if one testifies for the prosecution against 
the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice is sentenced to 
five years in jail. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to two years in jail. If each betrays the other, 
each is sentenced to four years in jail. Since the prisoners are unable to communicate with each other, 
how should they act? For a historical overview of the prisoners’ dilemma, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992). In the iterated prisoners’ dilemma, two players repeat the game, thereby 
enabling a range of new behavior. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION (1984). 
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cooperated, you cooperate, and if he defected, you defect. In other words, tit-
for-tat entails behavior that is initially trusting, rewards cooperation with 
continued cooperation (positive reciprocity), and punishes cheating with 
defection (negative reciprocity). By punishing defection, the strategy 
encourages cooperation. The primary pitfall of a pure tit-for-tat strategy is that 
players can get trapped in a cycle of negative reciprocity. 19  Research 
demonstrates, however, that a player can break this costly cycle by randomly 
making an occasional, cooperative move in response to a defection.20 This is 
roughly akin to random “forgiveness.” Ultimately, this modification from pure 
tit-for-tat proves a more successful overall strategy.21 
From an evolutionary point of view, individuals whose behavioral 
tendencies matched this modified tit-for-tat strategy in the EEA would have 
been more successful in eliciting cooperation from others and therefore more 
likely to survive, reproduce, and have descendents than those whose did not. As 
a result of this ultimate, or evolutionary, cause, modern homo sapiens tends to 
behave as if engaging in a tit-for-tat strategy: we are initially trusting and 
cooperative; we have the mental capacity to keep track of exchanges and to 
judge their fairness; we remember defectors and have a strong emotional urge 
to retaliate; and we are capable, if not prone, to forgive and resume relations, 
provided the relationship is important and that sufficient trust is reestablished. 
A growing body of scientific research is uncovering reconciliatory behaviors in 
other social animals22 and tracing the physiological correlates, or proximate 
 
 19. Negative reciprocity also may carry certain associated costs. See Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory 
Todd Jones, In Our Bones (or Brains): Behavioral Biology, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE 
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 283, 287 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & 
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2007) (“In dynamic environments where responses to social norms are in 
flux, decisions to punish may not only be costly in and of themselves, but may carry steep opportunity 
costs associated with failing to cooperate with a previous defector who has newly decided to 
cooperate.”). 
 20. Computer simulations conducted in the Computational Laboratory for Complex Adaptive 
Systems at the Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution have shown that game-theoretic 
strategies employing forgiving, or generous strategies, defined by continuing to cooperate to some 
extent, even in the face of defection, are evolutionarily successful strategies. Research results are on file 
with the authors. See generally The Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nexus—The 
Biology of Conflict Resolution, http://www.cncrnet.org/nexus/research.html (last visited May 27, 2009). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Other social primates engage in conciliatory and consolation behaviors to restore important 
relationships after fights and other aggression. See, e.g., Josep Call, Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. de 
Waal, Reconciliation Patterns Among Stumptail Macaques: A Multivariate Approach, 58 ANIMAL 
BEHAV. 165 (1999); Frans B.M. de Waal, Primates: A Natural Heritage of Conflict Resolution, 289 
SCIENCE 586 (2000) (primates generally); Frans B.M. de Waal, Reconciliation Among Primates: A 
Review of Empirical Evidence and Unresolved Issues, in PRIMATE SOCIAL CONFLICT 111 (William A. 
Mason & Sally P. Mendoza eds., 1993) (primates generally); Frans B.M. de Waal & Jennifer J. 
Pokorny, Primate Conflict Resolution and Its Relation to Human Forgiveness, in HANDBOOK OF 
FORGIVENESS 17 (Everett L. Worthington Jr. ed., 2005) (primates); Frans B.M. de Waal & Angeline 
van Roosmalen, Reconciliation and Consolation Among Chimpanzees, 5 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & 
SOCIOBIOLOGY 55 (1979) (chimpanzees). See generally NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Filippo 
Aureli & Frans B.M. de Waal eds., 2000) (primates generally). These behaviors may be evolutionary 
antecedents of the human behaviors associated with seeking and granting forgiveness. 
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causes, of trust, fairness, vengefulness, and forgiveness. 23  Together, these 
tendencies constitute a behavioral cycle of reconciliation conceptualized in the 
following schema: 
 
 
Figure 1: The Reconciliatory Cycle24 
This schema describes the behaviors associated with cooperation, conflict, 
and its resolution. Conflict occurs when a party perceives through its sense of 
fairness that another party has violated expected norms of behavior, thereby 
breaching the trust between them. The party that sees itself as injured by the 
violation can punish, forgive, or do both. This party can resume cooperative or 
tolerant relations, or not, depending upon the satisfaction of retaliatory urges, 
sufficient trust, and the level of interdependence (including benefits of 
cooperation). The converse (in which retaliatory urges are not satisfied, there is 
 
 23. Social psychologists assert that forgiveness is related to empathy. For a good summary of this 
relationship, see Loren Toussaint & Jon R. Webb, Gender Differences in the Relationship Between 
Empathy and Forgiveness, 145 J. SOC. PSYCH. 673 (2005). Recent investigations of the functional 
neuroanatomy associated with empathy and forgiveness show, however, that they are distinct. 
Researchers in the United Kingdom used functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine 
the neural correlates of making empathic and forgivability judgments. Tom F.D. Farrow et al., 
Investigating the Functional Anatomy of Empathy and Forgiveness, 12 NEUROREPORT 2433 (2001). 
These results suggest that “attempting to understand others is physiologically distinct from determining 
the forgivability of their actions.” Id. at 2435. Although the two types of judgments shared activations in 
some areas of the brain, including the left frontal cortex, activation of the posterior cingulate gyrus was 
unique to forgiveness judgments. Id. This is a region that has been associated with decisionmaking, 
attentional tasks, and problem-solving, including an awareness that other people may hold views 
distinct from our own. Id. There seems to be a biological explanation for why we can put ourselves in 
another person’s shoes without necessarily being able to forgive them. 
 24. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www. 
cncrnet.org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf. 
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insufficient trust, or the level of interdependence is weak) and the emotions 
associated with it create resistance to reconciliation among individuals in dyadic 
conflict. 
The reconciliatory cycle depicts only the behavioral mechanisms of the 
injured party; however, the offender’s behavior is equally relevant, not only to 
trigger retaliation but also to hasten forgiveness. The evolution of apologetic 
behavior makes sense in light of this scenario. Some way of hastening 
forgiveness would be to the advantage of a target of retaliation. Social signals 
that sufficiently assure the vengeful party that the offender will not repeat the 
offending behavior can mitigate the costs of retaliation to both parties and can 
lead toward reconciliation. 25  But the resumption of cooperative relations 
requires the resumption of trust. Thus, the ability both to make a sincere 
apology and to gauge its sincerity is crucial. Absent perception of an apology 
that sufficiently signals the future trustworthiness of the offender, the aggrieved 
party would resist reconciliation. Moreover, the offender’s sense of fairness can 
also come into play in judging the fairness of the punishment: a punishment that 
the offender perceives as unfair may invoke retaliatory urges, mistrust, and 
resistance to cooperation, leading to an ongoing cycle of negative reciprocity. 
IV 
RESISTANCE TO RECONCILIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERGROUP 
CONFLICT 
By definition, the social behaviors that constitute the reconciliatory cycle 
are behaviors that evolved in social groups. They work most efficiently in the 
context of intragroup conflict, in which the victim and the offender are 
members of so-called in-groups.26 Fairness and cheating are best understood 
through the norms of in-group interaction. The opportunity for repeat 
 
 25. Recent theoretical scholarship suggests that apologetic behavior evolved for this purpose. See 
Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors Have in 
Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1066–67 (2004) (“Individuals who develop the emotional 
framework necessary for the effective use of apology and forgiveness are thus placed at a competitive 
advantage relative to those individuals who must incur the full costs of moralistic aggression.”); Erin 
Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1147–53 (2002). 
Computational studies recently performed at the Primate Research Institute at Kyoto University in 
Japan suggest that apology can play a role similar to altruistic punishment as a means of maintaining 
cooperation, as long as the apology, which signals a willingness to conform to social norms in the future, 
is sufficiently costly. Kyoko Okamoto & Shuichi Matsumura, The Evolution of Punishment and 
Apology: An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, 14 EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY 703, 713–15 (2000). 
 26. An in-group is a social group with which an individual identifies as a member and expresses a 
bias in favor of other members. In contrast, individuals are negatively biased toward others who are 
members of an out-group. The terms are identified with social-identity theory and are commonly used 
in sociology. See generally Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel 
eds., 1979) (social-identity theory). The terms may have originated with William Graham Sumner, who 
coined the term “ethnocentrism.” WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE 
SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 13 (1906). 
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interaction, both positive (cooperation) and negative (retaliation), is greater 
within a social group. The need to resume cooperative relations with fellow 
group members is greater than the need to do so with those outside the group, 
thereby encouraging apologetic and forgiving behaviors among group members. 
In the context of the social group, costly retaliation by an individual—costly in 
the sense that the individual benefit is exceeded by the individual cost to the 
retaliating party—is a social good benefiting the entire group. In addition, 
retaliation serves as “face-saving” behavior, signaling to all group members the 
victim’s level of resistance to further victimization by any other group member. 
Signaling and communication of emotion are social skills that evolved in 
tandem with the requisite cognitive abilities to interpret and respond to the 
signals.27 In this context, social anthropoids are emotionally contagious.28 The 
emotions displayed in an interpersonal, dyadic conflict engage the entire group, 
thereby inviting support from other in-group members. 
Evolution of these behaviors and our brains took place in an ancestral social 
environment initially consisting of small, stable bands of highly interdependent 
and closely related individuals that would temporarily split into sub-bands.29 
Although members of the in-group were subject to strategic pressures to 
cooperate, out-group members were not subject to the same pressures and were 
therefore more likely to successfully cheat. This made the cognitive capacity to 
distinguish in-group from out-group members and the differential treatment of 
them (prejudice) adaptive traits. Prejudicial and xenophobic behavior—for 
example, fear and distrust of strangers—is shared by most social primate 
species, suggesting that it was inherited through our common ancestry.30 
Xenophobia is also demonstrated by intergroup conflict, primarily in the form 
of lethal raiding.31 Intergroup conflict was exacerbated by bipedalism and 
 
 27. See generally JONATHAN H. TURNER, ON THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN EMOTIONS: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN AFFECT (2000). 
 28. See FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS 
AND OTHER ANIMALS 69–70 (1997). 
 29. See generally DEAN FALK, PRIMATE DIVERSITY (2000). 
 30. Chimpanzees are territorial and attack male out-group members who wander into the in-
group’s home range. Additionally, they patrol the edges of the group range. See generally RICHARD 
WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES: APES AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 
(1996). For comparisons with so-called primitive human society, see Christopher Boehm, Segmentary 
‘Warfare’ and the Management of Conflict: Comparisons of East African Chimpanzees and Patrilineal–
Patrilocal Humans, in COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 136 
(Alexander H. Harcourt & Frans B.M. de Waal eds., 1992). For a discussion of the evolutionary 
foundations of learning mechanisms leading to fear of out-group members, see Terry A. Maroney, 
Unlearning Fear of Out-Group Others, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Spring 2009). 
 31. For a good overview of the evolution of tribalism and warfare, see MATT RIDLEY, THE 
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 150–93 (1996). The 
relationship between feelings toward members of one’s own group and those toward those in the out-
group are not necessarily directly related. That is, affiliative feelings toward one do not create hostility 
toward the other. See Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup 
Hate?, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 429 (1999) (A preference for members of the in-group, rather than direct 
animus toward an out-group, motivates discrimination against the out-group.). 
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upright walking, which allowed our ancestors to forage over a larger range, 
supporting the formation of bigger groups.32 The formation of larger groups also 
provided better protection from predators, including other humanoids. 
Ironically, social and competitive pressures within large groups also encouraged 
continuous division into additional small, more-manageable groups.33 More 
groups equals more boundaries between territories and, in a xenophobic 
species, more intergroup conflict. Larger groups trump smaller groups in 
intergroup conflict, so selective pressures favored the social–emotional 
repertoire needed to form and maintain larger groups and to motivate them 
through emotional contagion to defend and attack.34 As a result, humans have 
the tendency to be cooperative and tolerant toward in-group members while 
hostile and intolerant toward out-group members.35 
The selective pressures toward larger-group formation, together with the 
increasing probability of conflict with members of out-groups, also favored the 
cognitive ability to manage group boundaries. Groups can grow either by 
increasing reproduction or by inducting individuals from outside the group. 
Although some transfer between groups is necessary to prevent inbreeding, 
there was a strong incentive to assimilate non-kin males who could help deter 
attack and take territory.36 Assimilation carried the risk of increased intragroup 
conflict; therefore, in-group members had to be discriminating as to which 
individuals to induct. Combined with the problem of distinguishing friend from 
foe in a larger group consisting of less-closely related individuals, assimilation 
created evolutionary pressure on the cognitive capacity both to recognize 
insiders from outsiders, and to tolerate insiders but reject outsiders. 
In this way, evolved reconciliatory behavior favoring social cooperation 
helped define groups, favored xenophobia, and promoted intergroup conflict. 
 
 32. Michael J. Lovaglia, Chana Barron & Jeffrey Houser, Social Development and Human 
Evolution: Managing the Ingroup Boundary 5 (Jan. 31, 2003) (unpublished presentation to the Theory 
Workshop, Dep’t of Sociology, Univ. of Iowa) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 33. Id. at 5. 
 34. See TURNER, supra note 27, at 30–34. 
 35. See generally THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM: EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF 
XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION, RACISM, AND NATIONALISM (Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger & 
Ian Vine eds., 1987). GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) is considered the 
seminal work on prejudice by most psychologists and sociologists but lacks reference to evolution. 
Similarly, much of the more influential social-psychology theories on prejudice and stereotyping lack an 
evolutionary perspective. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from 
the Distribution of Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 735 (1984) 
(“social role theory” of stereotyping); Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of 
Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, 
eds., 1986) (“aversive racism” theory); David L. Hamilton & Robert K. Gifford, Illusory Correlation in 
Interpersonal Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCH. 392 (1976) (“illusory correlation” theory of stereotyping); Tajfel & Turner, supra note 26, at 33 
(“social identity” theory alternative to Allport). More recently, some social psychologists are 
integrating evolutionary explanations into their work. See, e.g., HAROLD D. FISHBEIN, THE ORIGINS 
OF PREJUDICE 39–80 (2002). 
 36. Lovaglia, Barron & Houser, supra note 32, at 8. 
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In turn, intergroup conflict created more selective pressures favoring the 
cognitive ability to discriminate, socially cohesive behaviors toward members of 
the in-group, and hostile behaviors toward members of the out-group. 
Therefore, intergroup conflict involved an additional layer of resistance to 
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation that could be summarized as inherent 
prejudicial behavior expressed by fear, distrust, and hostility toward out-group 
members. 
V 
RESISTANCE TO RECONCILIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN SOCIAL 
NETWORKS 
Up to this point, this article has focused on how the strategic dynamics of 
dyadic interaction underlie the ultimate and proximate biological causes of an 
individual’s tendency to resist reconciliation and cooperation generally. The 
tendency to resist can be compounded by two additional levels of strategic 
dynamics: (1) the strategic dynamics of interaction in triads or larger groups, 
which become quite complicated very quickly due to the possibility of 
coalitions; and, perhaps more subtly, (2) the population-level dynamics of local 
interactions that arise as a result of these interactions taking place within 
specific social architectures. These population-level effects may result from 
interactions that take place in a dyad or a larger group, but the effects are 
independent from the game-theoretic, strategic decisionmaking that provides 
the customary frame for thinking about cooperative interaction. Both the 
strategic dynamics of large-group interaction and the dynamics related to social 
architecture are properly thought of as sources of barriers to large-group 
cooperation. But given the long-standing problems of tractability faced by 
theories of social choice in groups larger than two, we focus here on the 
structural dynamics that influence dyadic interactions in larger groups.37 
A. Characteristic Social Architecture 
The evolved tendency to resist reconciliation in intergroup conflict is 
complicated by more-recent changes in social-group architecture. Modern 
homo sapiens appeared, approximately 100,000 years ago, during the 
Pleistocene.38 Because the Pleistocene ended only 12,000 years ago, most human 
 
 37. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951) (laying 
out modern social-choice theory and showing that no social-choice rules exist to produce stable 
outcomes in large groups); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (laying out public-
choice theory and the frailties of decisionmaking in large groups); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (demonstrating that 
even where members of large groups share common interests, concerted, collective action cannot be 
assumed). For a recent attempt to reconcile rational-choice and structural conceptions, see LUIS 
FERNANDO MEDINA, A UNIFIED THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2007). 
 38. Vinayak Eswaran, Henry Harpending & Alan R. Rogers, Genomics Refutes an Exclusively 
African Origin of Humans, 49 J. HUMAN EVOLUTION 1, 1–2 (2005). 
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psychological mechanisms are adapted to challenges encountered in Pleistocene 
environments described above;39 that is, our brains are much as they were then. 
Twelve thousand years in evolutionary terms is just a blink of the eye, offering 
little time for natural selection to further evolve our brains so as to significantly 
change behavioral tendencies. The social environment in which we now live, 
however, has changed dramatically in this time period. With the technological 
development of agriculture, it became possible to live in much larger groups 
and stay in one place. Instead of occasionally competing groups of comparably 
small bands of related individuals, large urban populations coordinate vastly 
diverse activities supported by evolving cultural institutions, such as the rule of 
law. Individuals are less reliant on an immediate, homogeneous, and 
geographically bounded social network. Today, it is relatively easy to travel, 
communicate, and form cooperative relationships outside such a community. 
The dramatically increasing importance of the Internet is possibly hastening this 
trend by replacing small, regularly-connected social networks of the EEA with 
extremely large, scale-free networks. The result: few individuals will remain 
highly connected, but the vast majority of individuals will lead largely 
unconnected, anonymous lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A: A regularly connected, degree-homogeneous network 
representative of what may have been typical of the EEA. B: A scale-free, 
degree-heterogeneous network representative of the modern age. 40  For 
illustrative purposes, the structure of the network and explicitly not the group 
size is representative. 
Social architecture matters. Average degree (the number of connections an 
individual shares with others in the social network) and heterogeneity of 
degree, for example, can have dramatic effects on the prevalence of pro-social 
 
 39. See generally Donald Symons, On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human 
Behavior, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF 
CULTURE, supra note 10, at 137–59. The important point is not the precise point in history at which our 
brain evolved, but that the environment in which it evolved is different than the environment of today. 
 40.  For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet. 
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf. 
06_YARN & JONES_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:06:55 AM 
Spring 2009] UNDERSTANDING RESISTANCE 75 
behavior in large groups. Our research on evolutionary dynamics in networks 
demonstrates that a certain level of degree is necessary for reciprocal 
cooperation to arise, but that when degree becomes large relative to population 
size, such reciprocity suffers.41 Further, our simulations show that reciprocal 
strategies that promote cooperation in the degree-homogeneous, regularly 
connected social networks typical of the EEA are not as successful in 
promoting cooperation in the degree-heterogeneous networks of the modern 
age.42 In short, we have a Paleolithic mind in a postmodern age, and behavior 
that seems irrational in the present environment may be perfectly rational when 
considered in the context of the EEA. This mismatch between our ancestral, 
evolved brains and the present-day environment may explain the various 
heuristics, biases, and emotions that seem to depart irrationally from the model 
of homo economicus decisionmaking. Emotional contagion is less effective 
across a larger, less-interconnected social network. And there may be other 
structural factors than can be identified.43 So, particular social structures that 
deviate significantly from social structures of the EEA can be barriers to 
effective group cooperation. 
B. Integration 
One well-studied question of social structure44 is the extent to which efforts 
at integration reduce prejudicial behavior. It has been noted that with 
intergroup conflict, the action happens on the borders.45 More nuanced is the 
idea that the structure of the borders themselves matters. Recent models 
attempting to predict civil violence using agent-based network models have 
demonstrated that there is little conflict with full segregation and little conflict 
with full integration—it is in intermediate stages, where there is a critical mass 
of in-group–out-group behavior, that conflict arises. 46  Our recent work 
subjecting the contact hypothesis to varying levels of integration has produced 
 
 41. Our current work explores the relationship of local clustering to average degree and 
heterogeneity of degree in the promotion of cooperation. Gregory Todd Jones, Douglas H. Yarn, 
Reidar Hagtvedt & Travis Lloyd, Homogeneity of Degree in Complex Social Networks as a Collective 
Good, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 931 (2008). 
 42. It may not be particularly surprising that high average degree is harmful to cooperation, given 
that it is well known that fully connected “mean field” simulations lead to pure defection when 
evolutionary replication dynamics are at play. Id. A particularly important finding of our work is that 
heterogeneity of degree exerts an influence on cooperation that is statistically distinct from average 
degree. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. This question was developed in Allport’s contact hypothesis. See ALLPORT, supra note 35. It 
was made famous by Shellling’s models of segregation. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES 
AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). 
 45. See supra note 44; infra note 46. 
 46. See May Lim, Richard Metzler & Yaneer Bar-Yam, Global Pattern Formation and 
Ethnic/Cultural Violence, 317 SCIENCE 1540, 1542 (2007) (identifying a process of global pattern 
formation in which violence occurs at the boundaries of regions differentiated by culture). 
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similar results.47 At levels approaching full segregation, prejudicial strategies 
(wherein individuals behave reciprocally with members of their own group, but 
always defect against members of other groups) suffer no particular 
disadvantage given that there is no one to act prejudicially against. At levels 
approaching full integration, prejudicial strategies are driven to extinction and 
social welfare is maximized. However, at intermediate levels of integration, 
prejudicial strategies are more successful than nonprejudicial strategies, and 
cooperation, along with social welfare, suffers. So certain intermediate levels of 
integration could exacerbate resistance to reconciliation and effective 
cooperation. 
 
Figure 3: The evolutionary success of prejudicial strategies as a percentage 
of the population (Prejudice) and social welfare measured as cooperative 
interactions as a percentage of overall interactions (Cooperation).48 
C. Nonlinear Participation Effects 
Social dynamics are often nonlinear. Consider the example of critical mass: 
At the end of a particularly moving speech or musical performance, a few 
people will come to their feet during the applause, followed by a few more, and 
then, with the addition of only one other individual, a threshold is reached that 
brings the entire audience to its feet.49 Even after continued efforts to involve as 
 
 47. Our work investigates the robustness of the contact hypothesis when subjected to various 
spatial conditions. Results of computer simulations show a nonlinear relationship between integration 
policy and the success of prejudicial strategies. Small modifications to interventions can therefore have 
disproportionate effects on prejudicial behavior. 
 48. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet. 
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf. 
49. An atomic pile ‘goes critical’ when a chain reaction of nuclear fission becomes self-sustaining; 
for an atomic pile, or an atomic bomb, there is some minimum amount of fissionable material that 
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many individuals as possible, the addition of one more individual, or a small 
group of individuals, can cause a cascade, or a threshold effect, that brings 
about a phase transition50 resulting in large-scale collective action. This also 
involves emotional contagion. Our simulations show that the addition of a 
single relationship or the conversion of a single agent can cause network effects 
that transform the entire population.51 So, Herculean efforts directed at a high 
threshold may offer no results, whereas very small efforts can bring about 
system-wide change if the threshold is low. The mistaken impression that efforts 
toward reconciliation and cooperation in large groups produce linear results can 
be a significant barrier to the success of these efforts. 
D. Institutional Design 
As important as recognizing the nonlinearity of social dynamics is 
recognizing that specific individuals may be more likely to bring about a 
cascade of collective action than others. When the evolved mechanisms of our 
species-typical brain fall short in the modern environment, we depend on the 
design of targeted institutions to fill the gap, and certain individuals are more 
relevant to this task. Certainly, the identification of these relevant individuals is 
not an easy task, but our recent simulations demonstrate that it is possible.52 The 
sparse culling of only a few relationships can result in network effects that 
spread reciprocal cooperation throughout the network. 
 
 
 
has to be compacted together to keep the reaction from petering out . . . . The principle of critical 
mass is so simple that it is no wonder that it shows up in epidemiology, fashion, survival and 
extinction of species, language systems, racial integration, jaywalking, panic behavior, and political 
movements. 
SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 89. See generally GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE 
CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION (1993). 
 50. A phase transition is an abrupt change in a system, as when water, upon reaching its boiling 
point, suddenly becomes a vapor. 
 51. See figs. 4–6, infra pp. 78–80. 
 52. Id. 
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Figure 4: A sparse culling severs only a few relationships, but results in 
network effects that spread reciprocal cooperation throughout the network. 
The lighter shades represent cooperating, reciprocating strategies.53 Conversely, 
the addition of a single, targeted relationship can produce similar positive 
effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet. 
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf. 
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Figure 5: A single targeted relationship is added resulting in network effects 
that spread reciprocal cooperation throughout the network. The lighter shades 
represent cooperating, reciprocating strategies.54 
The timing of exogenous interventions is also critically important. The use 
of sparse culling in a network that is not at equilibrium can result in extreme 
fragmentation of the network. (See top panels of Figure 6). In contrast, an 
identical sparse culling implemented after the network has reached a stable 
equilibrium brings about the desired results while maintaining the overall 
cohesiveness of the social network. (See bottom panels of Figure 6). 
 
                        A                                                                 B 
 
 54. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet. 
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf. 
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Figure 6: Timing of interventions counts for a lot. In the upper two panels 
(A & B), sparse culling is employed before the network reaches equilibrium. In 
the bottom two panels (C & D), the network is allowed to reach equilibrium 
before sparse culling is employed. The lighter shades represent cooperating, 
reciprocating strategies.55  
Finally, these barriers related to social architecture are highly interrelated. 
Properly designed institutions can help to overcome dynamics in characteristic 
social structure and can identify opportunities in nonlinear participation effects. 
But it should be clear that institutions improperly targeted or improperly timed, 
even when well-intentioned, can bring about unanticipated phase transitions 
that can produce unintended results. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
How is this relevant to truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs)? 
Admittedly, evolutionary biology is a blunt tool with which to analyze the 
complexities of intergroup conflict in modern human societies: it is reductionist 
by definition. Yet the basic principles of human behavior derived from a 
biological perspective offer some insight into what a TRC must do to overcome 
resistance and actually achieve intergroup reconciliation. At the individual 
level, TRCs must satisfy retaliatory urges, induce apology and forgiveness, 
evoke emotional contagion, and build sufficient trust while reducing prejudice. 
Much of the criticism directed at TRCs focuses on their inability to deliver 
 
 55. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet.org 
/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf. 
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retributive justice. 56  Most TRCs cannot do so because they operate in 
transitional societies in which the government is too weak or too dependent 
upon still-powerful perpetrators to prosecute them. Without punishment, are 
perpetrators’ testimonies and apologies, if any, sufficiently costly to be accepted 
as a signal of trustworthiness or to induce forgiveness? To the extent apology 
and forgiveness occur at the individual level through TRC proceedings, how 
does that get transferred through emotional contagion to a societal or national 
level? At the group level, TRCs must counteract negative social-architecture 
effects, overcome disadvantageous degrees of integration, engage enough 
people to reach critical mass, reduce the influence of negative relationships 
while enhancing the influence of positive ones, and do it all at the right time. 
It is unrealistic to expect this of a single institutional intervention. 
Intergroup reconciliation in the wake of longstanding historic injustices is by 
necessity a long and complex process of which a TRC is merely a step in that 
direction. To the extent they are successful in overcoming some resistance to 
reconciliation, TRCs may simply provide individuals with some sense of 
belonging to a superordinate group with the former victimizers,57  provide 
opportunities to “get to know one another better” so as to reduce fear 
conditioning,58 or provide enough common narrative of the past (“truth”) to 
undermine the competing narratives necessary to support continued 
adversarialism, thereby increasing the effectiveness of other reconciliatory 
efforts. Indeed, TRCs rarely operate in isolation. As James Gibson points out in 
this symposium, TRCs may be more the product of change than the cause of 
it59—an observation that has evolutionary implications of its own. Usually, other 
reconciliatory efforts are taking place at different societal levels. Presumably, if 
enough individuals or the “right” individuals are positively affected, a 
transformative critical mass will be reached that signals a breach in the 
biological barriers to reconciliation. 
 
 
 56. For a summary of this criticism and citations to legal scholars voicing it, see Kevin Avruch & 
Beatriz Vejarano, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography, 
4 ONLINE J. PEACE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION 37, 38–39 (2002). 
 57. See Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (Spring 2009) 
(discussing how procedural justice promotes superordinate-group identification to manage intergroup 
conflict). 
 58. See Maroney, supra note 30, at 87–88. (suggesting that racial integration and increased contact 
can reduce evolutionarily-driven fear conditioning) 
 59. James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 124 (Spring 2009). 
